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ABSTRACT: The paper defends the thesis that it's possible to maintain some conceptual 
preconditions of overcoming of relativistic intentions in modern philosophy of science (“there are 
no any general foundations in philosophy of science”). We found two general foundations in 
philosophy of science as a minimum. From the first side it's realistic to reveal on the base of special 
understanding of time the meaning of time not only in natural thought (especially in theory of 
gravity) but also in humanitarian knowledge. That's why philosophy of science has independent 
position in epistemology and ontology corresponding to interpretation of time as a general category 
of scientific thinking. The nature of time has internally inconsistent (paradoxical) character. Time is 
phenomenon which existing and not existing at the same time. This phenomenon is identified with 
imaginary movement and also ideal (formal) process of formation of the nature. The general 
understanding of time is connected with its “mathematical” meaning as calculable formal regulation 
of language practice and also the universal organization rules of quantitative parameters of 
intelligence of natural (physical) processes. From the second side we can say that exist an actual 
branch of philosophy of science. It exists on the basis of disclosure of aprioristic limits of 
consciousness of its cultural and historical development. There is possible a special interpretation of 
time. In that context time is the connection of an action of the cultural phenomenon or its “energy” 
with some kind of “weight”, the historical importance of a separate limit of consciousness through 
analog of “distance” as intensity of cultural and historical space (or “oppositional nature of 
interaction of mental intentions”). 
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 Introduction: Main Approaches to the Foundations of Philosophy 
of Science 
Relevance of a question of conceptual prerequisites of overcoming of relativism in 
modern philosophy of science is caused by an essential theoretical divergence 
between the intensions of classical thought connected with idea of the organization of 
integrity of scientific knowledge, and also modern approaches to understanding of the 
idea of the organization of science. Within classics I. Kant allocating metaphysical 
fundamentals of natural sciences used distinction of ways of representation of the 
nature in formal and their material meaning [1, p. 987]. It assumed that “... any 
doctrine if it system, i.e. the certain set of knowledge ordered in compliance with the 
principles, is called as science. ... In the true sense it is possible to call science only 
that, which reliability apodictic. ... The science about the nature acquires the right to 
be called that only from pure part” [1, p. 988-989]. Thus, from the classical point of 
view, the knowledge comprising system of aprioristic laws admits scientific or able to 
be developed in that quality. And to this ideal most fully there corresponds 
mathematics, in particular Euclidean geometry and arithmetic [1, p. 990]. 
Idea of specific characteristics of aprioristic knowledge acts as the basis of a classical 
position. According to I. Kant, aprioristic knowledge receive proceeding from 
possible (“pure”) representations of a cognizable subject independent of experience 
[1, p. 991]. Such knowledge is caused by the requirement of a special form of 
contemplation. This form is based on designing of concepts corresponding to the 
deductive organization of bases of mathematics. Therefore though the pure 
philosophy about the “highest” or “formal” nature (i.e. the principles of things) also is 
possible without mathematics, any doctrine about concrete (financially certain) nature 
from mathematics continuously and “...will contain science in the true sense only in 
that measure in what the mathematics” [1, p. 991]. Thus, the carrier of formal (or 
transcendental) truth is the “pure philosophy” or metaphysics, knowledge from “only 
one concepts” [1, p. 989]; as the carrier of material (or “concrete”) truth the 
mathematics acts. Many other classical authors (R. Descartes, B. Spinoza, G. Leibniz, 
G. Hegel, etc.) adhered as a whole to similar views for a mathematics role in structure 
of general scientific knowledge.  
In work [2] was proved two theses: 
(1) in modern philosophy of science there is a radical reconsideration of classical 
positions in favor of statement under a question of meaning of deductive knowledge 
as itself, and to it – unities of bases of science (i.e. their relativization); 
(2) the relativism in modern philosophy of science directly follows from provisions 
of E. Husserl directed on criticism of the base of physical and mathematical natural 
sciences.  
Relativistic views got even into deduction kingdom – formal logic in the form of idea 
of relative randomness of creation of axiomatic theories and application of methods 
of the logical analysis [3, p. 5; 4, p. 2-3]. That’s why they say that “there are no any 
general foundations in philosophy of science”.  
Has Philosophy of Science an Independent Position in the Scopes 
of Epistemological and Ontological Studies?  
Disclosure of conceptual prerequisites of overcoming of a modern relativism 
becomes possible in the conditions of interpretation in work [5] philosophy of science 
as rather independent branch of fundamental knowledge, the unity of which subject 
domain isn't deduced and isn't synthesized, but is set as special opposition of research 
culture as a limit of her conscious consciousness. The contents of these prerequisites 
are directly connected with two moments:  
(1) allocation of a role of philosophy of science in ontological and epistemological 
studies;  
(2) disclosure of basis of development of philosophy of the science serving as the 
base of the possibility of understanding of the valid processes.  
In this regard in modern thought keeps relevance an important theoretical 
contradiction. On the one hand, K. Popper agrees that “natural sciences and natural 
philosophy are faced by a grandiose task – to create a coherent and clear picture of 
the Universe” [6, p. 13]. On another hand, the solution of this task is essentially 
complicated within modern concepts [5, p. 11-20]. We believe that the exit here can 
be found in the scope of analysis of conceptualization bases of time in classical and 
modern philosophy.  
The argument of our thesis means, first, the statement that time is among fundamental 
categories of natural sciences. It is caused by an orientation of natural-science 
thought on allocation of structure and regularities of course of natural processes. 
Secondly, as M. Heidegger notices, “the science in general can be defined as set of 
justifying interrelation of true provisions. This definition both isn't full, and doesn't 
catch science in its sense. Sciences as images of behavior of the person have a way of 
life of this real (person). Real we seize this terminologically as presence. ... As proof 
of that – and as – temporariness constitutes presence life, it was shown: historicity as 
the being’s device of an existence is “in a basis” temporariness” [7, p. 27, 451]. From 
all this follows that the category of time in natural sciences as an element of general 
scientific knowledge sends not only to area of natural processes, but also their sense 
concerning a life perspective in general and questions of life of the person in 
particular.  
Therefore, we also believe that the role (independent position) of philosophy of 
science in ontological and epistemological studies can be established during the 
analysis of bases of conceptualization of time in classical and modern philosophy. 
One of the ways of justification of philosophy of science opens through detection of 
its specifics in the general framework of ontological studies as problematic relation of 
reality/people. 
Special Meaning of Time as a General Foundation of Philosophy of 
Science 
In work [8] the following was revealed: 
1. The nature of time has internally inconsistent (paradoxical) character and consists 
in unity of its existence and not existence.  
2. Time is identified with imaginary movement in the Greek classics, and also ideal 
(formal) process of formation of the nature in the German classical thought.  
3. The general understanding of time is connected with its “mathematic meaning”, 
i.e. formality and a universalism as regulation of language practice, according to 
Aristotle, and also the organization of quantitative parameters of intelligence of 
natural processes, according to G. Hegel. 
Further researches showed that, in particular, J.-P. Sartre during the analysis of ideas 
of R. Descartes, I. Kant, G. Hegel, E. Husserl, A. Bergson and other thinkers comes 
to a conclusion that from the philosophical point of view on the nature and structure 
of reality it is impossible to reach the rational solution of the task, what concrete 
appearance the science basis has: phenomenology of consciousness or consciousness 
and life opposition. The solution of such task can be executed pragmatically on the 
basis of a metaphysical postulate on special type of informative “benefit”. In this 
regard time only in opportunity belongs to the nature as, “... as in Einstein's physics 
where find it possible to speak about a cognizable event as about having spatial 
measurements and one temporary measurement and defining the place in space time” 
[9, p. 624]. This conclusion assumes that is lawful both non-classical approach and 
traditional approach. Non-classical approach includes representation that the world 
and its attributes are a phenomenon of human consciousness. Framework of 
traditional views includes opposition between the subject and object (consciousness 
and life distinction) and space and time opposition, for example, in the form of a 
point and number (i.e. locations of object, and also a measure of its formation [10, p. 
51-59]) is meant.  
All of this nowadays essentially complicates philosophical justification of natural 
sciences. 
We take the principled stand which fundamental prerequisites are in this relation: 1) 
idea of discretization of cultural and historical process, and also 2) virtual nature of 
interaction of conscious limits of consciousness of philosophical and scientific 
knowledge (elements of limitation are found in real history and are in the 
oppositional relation to last and (or) hypothetically possible future moments) [5, p. 
11-44]. Our position sends to a complex of philosophical provisions, but also can be 
formulated in natural-science categories of a time point as t, energy as E,  m as a body 
weight, and also r as distances (enter the classical theory of gravitation (Newton) and 
relativistic mechanics (Einstein)). There is possible a special interpretation in which 
context time connects action of the phenomenon or its “energy” with some kind of 
“weight”, the historical importance of a separate limit of consciousness through 
distance analog as intensity of cultural and historical space, i.e. oppositional nature of 
interaction of intentions. The complex of philosophical ideas which allow finding a 
way of rational justification of natural sciences comes to light, coordinating modern 
level of philosophical understanding of time and life and elements of natural-science 
knowledge. 
Conclusion 
Thus, conceptual preconditions of overcoming of relativistic intentions in modern 
philosophy of science are: 
(1) allocation of a role of philosophy of science in ontological and epistemological 
studies which opens in the light of formation of special understanding of time 
revealing meaning of this category not only in natural-science, but also in 
humanitarian thought;  
(2) branch division of philosophy of science which could be made on the basis of 
disclosure of aprioristic limits of conscious consciousness of its cultural historical 
development.  
All of this opens prospect of cognition of natural and cultural and historical processes 
on the basis of a community of rather independent complexes of natural and 
humanitarian disciplines, their active interaction and mutual enrichment. 
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